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INTRODUCTION
The nonobviousness requirement plays a critical role in United
States patent law. The requirement ensures that patents will be
granted for only significant advances over previously existing technol-
ogy. Nonobviousness reflects "a careful balance between the need to
promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refine-
ment through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the
very lifeblood of a competitive economy."' The patent system's health
is linked to a properly working nonobviousness doctrine.
Much of the current discussion regarding nonobviousness
focuses on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
the court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. 2 The court's
jurisprudence in this area, and in particular the court's application of
a particular part of the nonobviousness doctrine-the "suggestion
test," is the target of recent scrutiny. The court's case law is the center
of two recent reports, one by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and the other by National Research Council (NRC) .) It is also the
subject of a currently pending case before the Supreme Court, KSR
I Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000).
3 See COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWrLEDGE-BAsED ECON.,
NAT'L RESFARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Mer-
rill et at. eds., 2004); FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf
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International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.4 The general conclusion of the two
reports and the briefing in support of certiorari in KSR is that the
Federal Circuit has improperly relaxed the nonobviousness require-
ment. The court has made it easier to find a claimed invention
nonobvious and, as a result, obtain and enforce an invalid patent.
One of the alleged causes of this reduction in the nonobviousness
standard is the suggestion test employed by the court.
The problem with the recent reports and the current argumenta-
tion before the Supreme Court in KSR is that none of the assertions
being made are supported by recent empirical data.5 The reports and
criticism are only based on the "feel" of the case law6 or the facts of
the KSR case alone.7 There is a real need for an empirical study that
systemically looks at the broader question of whether the Federal
Circuit has lowered the nonobviousness requirement and the narrow
question of whether the suggestion test is the cause. Such a study
would provide valuable data to test the current assertions about the
Federal Circuit's case law and inform decisionmakers, such as the
Supreme Court, who are presently considering modifying the nonob-
viousness doctrine.
4 Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006).
5 The NRC's report explicitly notes that no empirical analysis of these claims has
been done. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 3 ("The claim that quality
has deteriorated in a broad and systematic way could be, but has not been, empirically
tested.").
There are studies, none yet published, that focus on this recent criticism and
come to an opposite conclusion. See generally Supplemental Brief for the Respondents
at 4-6, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. June 6, 2006), 2006 WL
1547496 (collecting recent cases where the Federal Circuit has found patents obvious
and used a broad suggestion test and, not surprisingly, coming to the opposite conclu-
sion of most critics); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary
Lens: The "Suggestion Test" as a Rule of Evidence, 2006 BYU L. REv. (forthcoming) (focus-
ing on the specific claim that the Federal Circuit employs a strictly narrow suggestion
test and concluding that the Federal Circuit employs an evidentiary rule to determine
the breadth of evidence allowed to prove a suggestion to combine); Lee Petherbridge
& R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law
of Obviousness, 85 TEx. L. Rxv. (forthcomingJune 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=923309 (examining empirically the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness juris-
prudence and finding that the court has not weakened the standards for obtaining
patents). Notably, these studies either collect different data than the study reported
in this Article or take different looks at the same type of data.
6 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, ch. 4, at 12.
7 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
12-15, KSR No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 2453601 (noting that the
KSR case demonstrates the rigid application of the suggestion test and how it results
in an improper finding that the patent is obvious).
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This Article provides such an empirical study. 
The study exam-
ines all Federal Circuit cases over a four-year 
period considering the
nonobviousness of a patent claim. Appeals 
from both patent infringe-
ment cases before district courts and pending 
patent applications and
interferences before the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) are investigated. The study looks 
at the data in two levels of
detail.
First, the study takes a "macro-level" look 
at the collected data,
focusing on only the outcome of each of 
the nonobviousness claims.
Whether the Federal Circuit found the 
patent claim nonobvious or
obvious is recorded. In addition, whether 
the Federal Circuit
affirmed, reversed, or vacated the lower 
tribunal's decision is consid-
ered. The purpose of this macro-level study 
is to test the broad claim
being made in recent criticism-that the 
Federal Circuit has lowered
the nonobviousness requirement.
Second, the study takes a "micro-level" 
look at the actual reason-
ing behind the court's findings on the 
nonobviousness issue. This
part of the study examines what prompted a 
finding of nonobvious,
seeing if it was a failure to meet the suggestion 
test or something else.
The micro-level study also focuses on the 
procedural posture of the
case below-whether it was a grant of summary 
judgment, a grant of a
motion for judgment as a matter of law 
(JMOL), a verdict from a
bench trial, or a verdict from a jury 
trial. The micro-level study
attempts to measure the impact of the suggestion 
test on the nonobvi-
ousness analysis.
Based on this study's findings, the Article 
concludes that recent
criticism is not supported by the last four 
years of Federal Circuit case
law. In appeals from patent infringement 
cases, the macro-level study
finds a distribution that slightly favors 
findings of nonobvious, with
36.27% of the patents being found nonobvious 
and 28.43% of the
patents being found obvious.
8 In appeals from the USPTO, the
macro-level study finds a high percentage 
of findings of obvious in
85.19% of the patents. These results 
suggest that the court has not
lowered the nonobviousness requirement 
and may be maintaining a
higher nonobviousness requirement in 
the case of the USPTO. But
this conclusion is greatly tempered by 
the fact that the cases studied
may all include litigants and patent applicants 
that have already taken
into account a lowered nonobviousness 
standard. Thus, any inference
into the strength of the nonobviousness 
requirement from this data is
weak at best. The results of the macro-level 
study, therefore, while
8 The remaining percentage of patents, 
35.29%, were vacated by the court. See
infra Part I1I.A.1.
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providing some insight, cannot provide a solid conclusion one way or
the other.
The micro-level study produced more usable results. The sugges-
tion test causes a finding of nonobvious, or a vacation of a finding of
obvious, in 32.91% of the patents appealed from patent infringement
cases. The suggestion test causes similar findings in appeals from the
USPTO in 11.11% of patents appealed. These low percentages stand
in sharp contrast to claims that the suggestion test has caused the non-
obviousness requirement to lower, particularly in the context of the
USPTO. Instead, the suggestion test plays a fairly small role in the
court's nonobviousness jurisprudence.
This Article comes to these conclusions in the following manner.
First, in Part I, the Article provides a background on the nonobvious-
ness requirement, the suggestion test, and recent criticism. Part II of
the Article describes the empirical study, including the parameters
used and the study's limitations. Part III of the Article reports the
study's findings, starting first with the macro-level study's results and
then micro-level study's results. The Article then provides a detailed
conclusion, reiterating the more significant findings from the study.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Basics of the Nonobviousness Requirement
The nonobviousness 9 requirement in patent law has been termed
"the ultimate condition for patentability."'( An invention must be
more than just new and useful, it must also be of "a significant enough
technical advance to merit the award of a patent."' I The nonobvious-
ness requirement also "ask[s] whether an invention likely would
emerge in roughly the same time frame-that is, without significant
delay-'but for' the prospect of the patent, " 12 The requirement
ensures that a patent is granted for only those inventions that would
have not been created but for the incentive of patent protection.
9 The term "nonobviousness" is used to define the inquiry to determine whether
an invention is nonobvious or obvious. For the purposes of this Article, the term
nonobviousness does not indicate the ultimate conclusion that a claimed invention is
nonobvious, and thus eligible for patent protection.
10 See NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F.
Witherspoon ed., 1980).
11 ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY
644 (3d ed. 2002).
12 FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, ch. 4, at 6; see also id., ch. 4, at 7-8 (asserting
that this "but for" test instituted by the nonobviousness requirement ensures a proper
balance between patent protection and competition).
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The requirement ensures that patent protection is not given to
inventions that have no social benefit because they are of minimal
advance over what has already been done and "others would have
developed the idea even without the incentive of a patent."'13 Provid-
ing protection for obvious ideas is socially harmful because it can lead
to "a proliferation of economically insignificant patents that are
expensive to search and to license."1 4 Protection for obvious advances
skews the patent system's incentive structure-focusing would-be
inventors on minor developments as opposed to significant technolog-
ical advances. These obvious patents provide little benefit to society
due to their coverage of insignificant subject matter and clog the
inventive pathways to highly beneficial technological advances.
Nonobviousness, therefore, is an important requirement for
protection in the United States' patent system. 15 The doctrine plays a
central role in deciding which inventions are patentable, and thus get
a limited period of exclusivity, and those that do not. While initially a
common law requirement, the test for nonobviousness was codified by
the 1952 Patent Act.16 The statutory test for nonobviousness indicates
that:
A patent may not be obtained... if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which said subject matter pertains.
1 7
The Supreme Court, in Graham v. John Deere Co.,' addressed 35
U.S.C. § 103 and explained the process for determining nonobvious-
ness. 19 The Court noted that § 103 "lends itself to several basic factual
inquiries."2 0 There factual inquiry included: (1) identifying the "scope
and content of the prior art"; (2) determining the "differences
between the prior art and the claims"; and (3) ascertaining "the level
13 MERGES & DuFY, supra note 11, at 646; see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent
Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SuP. CT. ECON. REV.
1, 50-51 (2004) ("lAin optimal uniform scheme of protection will provide protection
that will leave some desirable innovative products unprofitable.").
14 MERGES & DUFv, supra note 11, at 647.
15 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MicH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
363, 370 (2001).
16 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
17 Id. § 103(a).
18 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
19 Id. at 12-17.
20 Id. at 17.
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of ordinary skill in the pertinent art."2' The Court then indicated that
"(a] gainst this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the
subject matter is determined."22 Secondary considerations are then
considered.
2 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,2 4 and
its predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, devel-
oped a structured approach to making the final determination of non-
obvious or obvious-the "suggestion test."25 Once the three initial
inquiries articulated in Graham are made, Federal Circuit case law
requires a showing that there is some "reason, suggestion, or motiva-
tion" that would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to com-
bine the relevant art teachings to make the patented invention. 26 The
Federal Circuit has made the suggestion test a required component of
any nonobviousness analysis in a patent infringement litigation and
part of the prima facie case of obvious during patent examination
before the USPTO. 27 The suggestion test provides an analytical tool
to determine when the jump can properly be made from defining the
relevant prior art, the skill in the art, and differences between the art
and the invention to a conclusion of obvious.28 A finding of obvi-
21 Id.
22 Id. This quote from the Supreme Court demonstrates how the term "nonobvi-
ousness" can also be used to define the ultimate conclusion in a nonobviousness anal-
ysis. For the sake of clarity, this Article will attempt to use the term "nonobviousness"
to only define the inquiry itself, not the result.
23 Id. at 17-18.
24 The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. See 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000). But see Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys,
Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831-32 (2002) (removing cases with only patent law counterclaims
out of the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction).
25 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.04[1] [e] (2005); see also In re
Fridolph, 134 F.2d 414, 416 (C.C.P.A. 1943) ("In considering more than one refer-
ence . . . the question always is: does such art suggest doing the thing which the
[inventor] has done?").
26 Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
27 Id.; In reThrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
28 One of the main goals of the suggestion test also is to combat against hindsight
bias. In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[Tlhe best defense
against the subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness analysis is
rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or motivation
to combine prior art references."). Hindsight bias is a significant problem in the
nonobviousness analysis. See Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demon-
stration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391,
1403-06 (2006) [hereinafter Mandel, Empirical Demonstration] (finding empirical data
to support the existence of hindsight bias). Professor Mandel's most recent experi-
mentation with mock jurors found that hindsight bias is so strong that even the sug-
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ousness cannot be made unless there is some impetus-that is a sug-
gestion, teaching, or motivation-to make the leap from what is
found in the individual pieces of prior art to the invention for which
patent protection is sought.
B. Recent Criticism of the Federal Circuit's Nonobviousness Jurisprudence
Much of the current discussion regarding nonobviousness
focuses on the Federal Circuit. The court's jurisprudence in this area,
and in particular the court's application of the suggestion test, is the
target of this recent scrutiny. The court's case law is the center of two
recent reports, one by the Federal Trade Commission and the other
by the National Research Council.2 9 It is also the subject of a
currently pending case before the Supreme Court, KSR International
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.10 The general conclusion of the two reports and
the briefing in support of certiorari in KSR is that the Federal Circuit
has improperly relaxed the nonobviousness requirement.31 The court
has made it easier to find a claimed invention nonobvious and, as a
result, obtain and enforce a patent. One of the alleged causes of this
reduction in the nonobviousness standard is the suggestion test
employed by the court.
The FTC's 2003 report notes a "perceived . . . trend since the
advent of the Federal Circuit toward reducing the size of the step
required for patentability-that is, reducing the rigor of the nonobvi-
ousness standard."32 As a result, the report concludes that more obvi-
ous patents are being issued by the USPTO and held valid by the
court.-13 The NRC's 2004 report comes to a similar, yet qualified,
conclusion.3 4 "[T] here might have been some dilution of the applica-
tion of the non-obviousness standard in biotechnology and some limi-
tations on its proper application to business methods patent
applications," and, as a result, patent quality is suffering.35 The peti-
gestion test may be unable to fully mitigate its effects in all cases. See Gregory Mandel,
Patently Non-Obvious I: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court
in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALEJ. OF L. & TECH. 1, 16 (2007) [hereinafter Mandel, Experi-
mental Study].
29 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
30 Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006).
31 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, 10-11, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
No. 04-1350 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2005).
32 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, ch. 4, at 9.
33 Id. at 8-9.
34 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 3.
35 Id.
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tion for certiorari in KSR, and the amici that supported the petition,
all come to a similar conclusion-the Federal Circuit relaxed the non-
obviousness requirement. 36 The United States, which filed a brief in
support of certiorari, specifically asserts that the Federal Circuit's non-
obviousness jurisprudence establishes "an inflexible requirement for
determining obviousness" that causes patent protection to extend to
"non-innovative combinations of familiar elements."3 7
These reports and briefs all argue, at least in part, that the
Federal Circuit's suggestion test causes this relaxation of the nonobvi-
ousness requirement.3 Because a suggestion must be found to hold a
claimed invention obvious, the suggestion test works as a "one-way
ratchet."39 It only acts as an obstacle to an obvious finding and, thus,
increases the likelihood of an erroneous nonobvious finding. The
Federal Circuit has also limited the suggestion test to suggestions in
the prior art, ignoring other, undocumented sources such as ordinary
skill.40 This increases the difficulty in finding a patent obvious,
further lowering the nonobviousness standard.41 Limiting the scope
of viable suggestions makes it extremely difficult to find claims invalid
that involve technologies, such as business methods, where there is
little memorialized and publicly available knowledge.42 Additionally,
36 See Brief of Amici Curiae Cisco Systems Inc., General Motors Corp., Hallmark
Cards, Inc., Fortune Brands, Inc., and Electrolux North America in Support of Rever-
sal at 1, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL
2452365 (noting that the Federal Circuit established "too lax a standard for patenta-
bility"); Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 9-10, No. 04-1350, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug.
22, 2006), 2006 WL 2452369; Brief of Amicus Curiae The Progress & Freedom Foun-
dation in Support of the Petitioner at 8-12, KSIA No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006),
2006 WL 2452361 (arguing that the Federal Circuit's case law is biased toward finding
a claimed invention nonobvious); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at
24-27 (citing both the FTC and NRC reports for support).
37 Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, KSR No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22,
2006), 2006 WL 1455398.
38 See id. (indicating that the Federal Circuit "has transformed" the suggestion
test into "an inflexible requirement" that "extends patent protection to non-innova-
tive combinations of familiar elements").
39 FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, ch. 4, at 14 (citing the testimony of former
USPTO director Q. Todd Dickinson that the suggestion test operates as a "one-way
ratchet: it can help confirm obviousness, but it does not necessarily identify
nonobviousness"),
40 See Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, supra note 36, at 7-9.
41 Id.
42 See NAT'L REsEARcH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 88-89 (noting that "[i]n an area
like business methods" the "published literature does not fully describe the state of
the art"). The NRC's report further notes that even when business method informa-
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obvious information is rarely documented 
because of its widely known
and uninteresting nature. Furthermore, 
the critics assert that by limit-
ing the scope of possible suggestions 
to the prior art, the USPTO's
ability to properly assess 
nonobviousness is especially 
hampered.
43
The USPTO cannot rely upon its 
own scientific expertise and knowl-
edge and must instead expend limited 
resources searching for sugges-
tions in prior art.
4 4 This causes the USPTO to allow 
patent
applications that are, in truth, 
directed toward obvious inventions.
Finally, the factual nature of the 
suggestion test impinges on the abil-
ity of litigants to successfully dismiss 
invalid patents on summary judg-
ment.45 This results in more unnecessary 
costs on patent players, the
judicial system, and society 
as a whole.
46
C. Need for an Empirical Study of 
Recent Federal Circuit
Nonobviousness Case Law
Unfortunately, the FTC and NRC 
reports and the briefs in
support of the petition for certiorari 
in KSR fail to perform any empir-
ical analysis to see if their conclusions 
are true-that the Federal Cir-
cuit had lowered the nonobviousness 
requirement and that the
suggestion test is the cause.
47 The reports and criticism cited above
are based on the "feel" of the case 
law48 or the facts of the KSR case
alone.49 An empirical study that 
systemically looks at both the
tion is published, it is mostly likely that 
"non-obvious information" is published. 
Id. at
90.
43 See Brief of the United States 
as Amicus Curiae, supra note 37, 
at 17-18; see also
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom7 
Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective 
of
PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 
888 (2004) ("The resulting analysis 
excludes
from consideration the judgment, intuition, 
and tacit knowledge of ordinary practi-
tioners in the field that cannot be documented 
in the written record."); Arti K. Rai,
Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in 
the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 907,
912-17 (2004) (describing the "key 
problem" of the "Federal Circuit's 
failure to
recognize that the USPTO can, and 
should, be allowed to insert its knowledge 
of the
art into the patent examination process.").
44 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
supra note 3, at 88-89 (concluding 
that the
USPTO is "severely handicapped").
45 See Brief of the United States as 
Amicus Curiae, supra note 37, at 17 
(stating
that "[t]he Federal Circuit's test 




47 The NRC's report admits that 
no empirical analysis has been done. 
NAr'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, 
at 3.
48 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra 
note 3, ch. 4, at 12.
49 See Brief of the United States as 
Amicus Curiae, supra note 37, at 12-15 
(noting
that the KSR case demonstrates the rigid 
application of the suggestion test and 
how it
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broader question of whether the Federal Circuit has lowered the non-
obviousness requirement and the narrow question of whether the sug-
gestion test is the cause needs to be done.
Information produced from such an empirical study is particu-
larly useful given the current discussions and the pending KSR case
before the Supreme Court. A good part of the calls for reform rest on
the assumptions that the Federal Circuit has lowered the nonobvious-
ness bar and that the suggestion test is to blame. If these assumptions
are baseless, reforms produced from them will be misdirected and
inefficient and, as a result, unlikely to improve patent quality. Such
reforms may have negative effects. Changes in the area of nonobvi-
ousness, an already difficult doctrine to grasp and apply, 50 will only
muddy the doctrine, making nonobviousness determinations uncer-
tain and unclear. In addition, focusing on the Federal Circuit's
nonobviousness jurisprudence and, specifically, the suggestion test
may simply waste resources and energy that are better directed to
other aspects of nonobviousness or other areas of patent law reform.
Making sure the problem with the current state of nonobviousness is
properly understood is the first step in nonobviousness reform.
Understanding the Federal Circuit's recent case law in the area takes
this first step.
This call for an empirical assessment is not to say that empirical
studies have never been done on nonobviousness. Professor Glynn
Lunney studied the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence in
a 2001 article. 51 Professor Lunney's study examined the percentage
of patents found invalid by the Federal Circuit, and its predecessor
court and regional circuits, due to a finding of obviousness in eight
different years spread over a fifty-year period.5 2 He found a drop in
the percentage of patents found obvious and attributed this drop to
the introduction of the Federal Circuit and the doctrinal changes to
nonobviousness the court introduced. 53 The study provides a great
50 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) ("Jefferson saw clearly the
difficulty in 'drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the
embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.,' (quoting Letter
from ThomasJefferson to Issac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 180-81 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, 1857))); Joseph P. Meara, Note,
just Who is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law's Mysterious Personage,
77 WASH. L. REV. 267, 272 (2002).
51 Lunney, supra note 15, at 370-75.
52 See id. (using previous studies to obtain data for the six pre-Federal Circuit data
points and collecting data for the final two Federal Circuit data points).
53 See id. at 372-80 (citing both the suggestion test and elevation of secondary
considerations as the doctrinal changes responsible for the reduction in obvious
findings).
2007]
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point of comparison to what is happening 
currently, but its last data
point is in 1994-1995.
54 Furthermore, the study looks no further 
than
the Federal Circuit's final holding on nonobviousness.
5 5 For example,
there is no investigation as to what the 
lower court's disposition was or
how the suggestion test was used by 
the Federal Circuit in the case.
The study provides some, but not much, 
assistance in evaluating the
recent claims by the FTC, NRC, and the 
petitioner and amici in KSR,
particularly with respect to the effects 
of the suggestion test. Profes-
sors John Alison and Mark Lemley also 
empirically looked at nonobvi-
ousness case law, but included 
district court opinions in the 
study.56
Furthermore, the study does not focus 
on the suggestion test's role in
nonobviousness cases. While this study, 
like Professor Lunney's, adds
tremendous value to the nonobviousness 
discussion, it does not
directly address the current debate.
Recent empirical studies also add 
to the current discussion.
These all have some bearing on recent 
criticism of the Federal
Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence. 
But none fully address all
the issues presented in KSR and the FTC 
and NRC reports. Professor
Greg Mandel wrote two articles reporting 
on his experimentation
using mock jurors to determine the effects 
of hindsight on the nonob-
viousness analysis.
57 The first article looked at the hindsight 
question
in general, finding a significant hindsight 
effect in nonobviousness
determinations.
58 Professor Mandel's second study focused 
on the
ability of the suggestion test to ameliorate 
the hindsight bias.
59 While
Professor Mandel's studies focused on 
the hindsight bias, he observed
that the suggestion test cannot be the 
cause of erroneous findings of
nonobvious because mock jurors found 
inventions nonobvious with
and without the suggestion test.
60 Sean McEldowney recently pub-
54 Id. at 371, 373.
55 Id. at 370-71 (describing the study).
56 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, 
Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 194-97 (1998).
57 Mandel, Empirical Demonstration, supra 
note 28, at 1406-09; Mandel, Experimen-
tal Study, supra note 28, at 11-20.
58 Mandel, Empirical Demonstration, 
supra note 28, at 1409-10.
59 See Mandel, Experimental Study, supra 
note 28, at 15-20. He found that hind-
sight bias is so strong that even the suggestion 
test may be unable to fully mitigate its
effects in all cases. Id. at 16. He noted 
that the suggestion test may do more 
to
reduce the effects of hindsight bias in 
complex technology cases. Id. at 33. 
Recent
theoretical and empirical work supports 
this claim. See Cotropia, supra note 5 
(manu-
script at 64); Sean M. McEldowney, New 
Insights on the "Death" of Obviousness: An 
Empir-
ical Study of District Court Obviousness 
Opinions, 2006 ST'AN. TEcn. L. REv. 4, 
41, http:/
/sdr.stanford.edu/STLR/Ar tices/06-STLR-4/McEldwney-Obviousness'pdf"60 Mandel, Experimtental Study, supra 
note 28, at 31-32.
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lished a study focusing on nonobviousness 
at the district court level.
6
McEldowney's findings show a decrease in 
the 1990s of both district
courts reaching the issue of nonobviousness 
and finding patents obvi-
ous.62 He found that, while this would appear 
to suggest that the non-
obviousness requirement has lowered, 
there may be other forces at
play. 63
Finally, a yet unpublished study by Professors 
Lee Petherbridge
and Polk Wagner comes the closest to 
fully addressing the questions
presented by recent criticism.
64  Professors Petherbridge and
Wagner's study takes a look at Federal 
Circuit nonobviousness cases
over a fifteen-year period, from 1990 through 
2005.65 While the study
takes a look at the claims of a lowering 
nonobviousness standard and
the suggestion test's role, the main thrust 
of the study is to determine
the stability and predictability of the 
court's nonobviousness doc-
trine.6 6 In reaching the conclusion that 
the doctrine is very stable, the
study also finds little evidence of a lowered 
standard or the suggestion
test acting as an obstacle to 
findings of obvious.
67
This very recent push to empirically 
study nonobviousness is
refreshing. There are still holes that 
need to be filled. A study is
needed that considers all of the recent 
Federal Circuit opinions that
span the period of the FTC and NRC 
reports and takes a complete
look at the impact of the suggestion 
test. This Article does just that.
Furthermore, when looking at the validity 
of empirical results, there is
benefit to overlapping studies. The results 
from an empirical study
becomes stronger if they are validated 
by another's results. In addi-
tion, the more ways nonobviousness 
is examined, the richer one's
understanding of the doctrine becomes.
61 McEldowney, supra note 59, 1 3.
62 Id. 1 63.
63 Id. 1 64-67 (noting that "the Federal 
Circuit's doctrinal shifts in obviousness
seem more subtle and less damning than 
some have asserted" and that the regional
variation amongst results contradicts the 
assertion that "the Federal Circuit has 
effec-
tively objectified obviousness").
64 See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra 
note 5 (manuscript at 5-20).
65 Id. (manuscript at 24-27). Notably, 
in contrast to the study reported in 
this
Article, Professors Petherbridge and Wagner's 
study does not collect data from Rule
36 cases and tallies results based on "analysis" 
as opposed to patents. Id. (manuscript
at 29-30, 44 tbl.5).
66 Id. (manuscript at 28-43) (noting 
that the "overall goal of this study is to 
con-
tribute to a burgeoning body of literature 
that addresses the effectiveness of the 
Fed-
eral Circuit at meeting the goals mandated 
by Congress at the time of its creation").
67 Id. (manuscript at 51-53).
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II. DESCIPTION OF THE STUDY
In order to fill the need for more information on the current
state of nonobviousness, a study of the Federal Circuit's recent nonob-
viousness jurisprudence is performed. The basic goal is to capture
and code all Federal Circuit decisions on nonobviousness over a
defined period. This population creates a data set that hopefully
provides a better insight into whether the Federal Circuit has lowered
the nonobviousness requirement and what role the suggestion test
plays in the doctrine.
A. Parameters of the Study
This study contains a defined population of written, final deci-
sions of the Federal Circuit issued over a four-year period, from Janu-
ary 1, 2002 through December 31, 2005.68 Only validity decisions are
included in the study, not decisions on unenforceability, such as ineq-
uitable conduct, prosecution laches, or patent misuse.69 The popula-
tion of this study initially includes only final decisions on validity, not
vacations or remands-all decisions where the issue of a patent's valid-
ity is still unsettled. The population is then expanded to include
those non-final decisions that reach any substantive conclusion on the
issue of nonobviousness. 70 Thus, opinions where a holding of nonob-
viousness is vacated are included in the study. The population is
68 The study's results on are file with the author and are available at
http://www.cotropia.com/nonobviousnessstudy.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2007).
The cases were obtained by searching LexisNexis's Federal Circuit database over
this four-year period for cases that included the terms "patent" and "infring!" to
gather appeals from patent infringement cases and the term "patent" in the "In re"
cases to gather appeals from the USPTO's determinations regarding applications,
reissues, and reexaminations. An additional search was made to capture appeals from
decisions by the USPTO in interferences-disputes as to inventorship of a claimed
invention. See Thomas P. Noud et al., Patent Law Issues Affected by the Predictability of
Technology in the Field of Invention, 88J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'V 603, 612 (2006)
("A patent interference is an administrative proceeding that results in an award of
priority to one of the parties" who is claiming to be the first to invent.).
69 For example, fifteen patents held unenforceable due to prosecution laches in
Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical Education & Research Foundation, 422 F.3d
1378, 1384-86 (Fed. Cir. 2005), were not included in this study.
70 Specifically excluded from this expanded population are cases where the issue
of nonobviousness arose in the setting of preliminary injunctions. Such cases were
avoided due to the unique standard under which substantive issues are judged when
reviewing preliminary injunctions. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that because of the differing level
of review, "[v]alidity challenges during preliminary injunction proceedings can be
successful, that is, they may raise substantial questions of invalidity, on evidence that
would not suffice to support a judgment of invalidity at trial").
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expanded to include these additional 
opinions so as to capture all of
the Federal Circuit's deliberations on the 
issue of nonobviousness
over the four-year period.
The study includes both published and unpublished 
written opin-
ions. Summary affirmances, "Rule 36" 
cases, 71 are also included in the
population to the extent information 
regarding the issues decided by
the court can be discerned from appellate 
briefs and the published
decisions below.
72 Only those decisions involving utility 
patents, as
opposed to design or plant patents, are 
included. In addition, results
will be separated based on whether 
it is an appeal from a patent
infringement decision by a United States 
district court or an affirmed
final rejection or interference 
decision of the USPTO.
73
The study is defined in terms of patents, 
not cases.74 Often opin-
ions included decisions on the nonobviousness 
of more than one
patent, and thus one opinion may result 
in more than one data point.
In addition, in those cases where decisions 
varied with regard to an
individual patent's claims-that is, some 
claims were found nonobvi-
ous while others found obvious-each 
set of validated or invalidated
claims are counted as a single patent. 
Therefore, for some cases, a
decision regarding one patent may 
be defined as two patents for the
purpose of the study.
71 Federal Circuit Rule 36 allows judgment 
of affirmance without opinion when
certain conditions exist and an opinion 
would have no precedential value. See 
Beth
Zeitlin Shaw, Note, Please Ignore This Case: 
An Empirical Study of Nonprecedential Opinions
in the Federal Circuit, 12 GEO. MASON L. 
REv. 1013, 1015 (2004) (noting that 
Rule 36
allows the court to affirm without opinion 
when "the court determines an opinion
would have no precedential value, and 
any of five other conditions exist").
72 Whether validity, and more particularly 
nonobviousness, was at issue in the
Rule 36 cases is discernable from the 
briefing to the court. The only information
lacking for such cases is the specific 
reasoning for the Federal Circuit affirming 
the
lower court's ruling on validity.
The inclusion of Rule 36 cases considering 
nonobviousness, of which there were
twenty-four, is a significant difference 
between this study and the one performed 
by
Professors Petherbridge and Wagner. 
See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 
5
(manuscript at 29-30) (noting that their 
results would change with the addition 
of
Rule 36 opinions to their data set).
73 Decisions from United States International 
Trade Commission are included
with the appeals from United States District 
Courts. There was, however, only one
such decision involving the issue of nonobviousness. 
See Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1338-42 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). In addition, USPTO
appeals included in the study were those 
from normal prosecution, reissues, and 
reex-
aminations. Appeals from interferences 
were also included to the extent that 
the
validity of the count was at issue.
74 This is another difference between 
this study and that performed by Professors
Petherbridge and Wagner. See Petherbridge 
& Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript 
at
25) (indicating that "their measurement 
metric is analyses").
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B. Data Collected
For each patent in the population, the following data was
collected from all of the Federal Circuit's opinions:
(1) case name, citation, and date of issuance;
(2) whether the patent was held nonobvious or obvious;
(3) whether the judgment below was from the grant of summary
judgment, the grant of ajudgment as a matter of law (JMOL), a bench
trial, or a jury trial;
(4) whether the Federal Circuit affirmed, reversed, or vacated the
lower tribunal's determination regarding nonobviousness;
(5) the reason the Federal Circuit affirmed, reversed, or vacated
the lower tribunal's nonobviousness determination.
75
C. Methodology
This is a population study, like those previously conducted by
Professors Allison and Lemley76 and Christian Chu. 7  The study
generates descriptive statistics to better understand the court's nonob-
viousness jurisprudence over the last four years. Statistical testing on
these descriptive statistics is also performed. This analysis provides
further information about the population and the significance of any
variations in nonobviousness decisions over the past four years.
This population can be treated as a subset of a "superpopula-
tion," as has been done in previous patent law studies by Professors
Allison, Lemley and Chu. 7 That is, the population of this study can
be used to predict the "population of all past and future . . . deci-
sions."79 The study can make predictions on the court's nonobvious-
ness jurisprudence of the past and the future. By both focusing on
the descriptive statistics the study produced and the inferences from
statistical testing on the population studied, a better understanding of
the court's nonobviousness jurisprudence will hopefully emerge.
75 Because of their summary nature, this information was not available for Rule
36 cases. In those cases, the reason was coded as unknown.
76 Allison & Lemley, supra note 56, at 201-02.
77 Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECe. L.J. 1075, 1094-95 (2001).
78 Allison & Lemley, supra note 56, at 201-02; Chu, supra note 77, at 1094.





As with most empirical studies, this 
study suffers from a number
of limitations. The limitations are divided into two 
categories-popu-
lation biases and inherent limitations.
8 0
1. Population Biases
A major complaint one may lodge 
against this study is that the
population selected is too narrow. First, 
a more complete picture of
the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness 
jurisprudence would emerge if
all of the court's jurisprudence was included, 
and thus all nonobvious-
ness cases should be included back 
to and beyond the court's creation
in 1982.1 It is true, more years would 
have provided a fuller picture.
But, the four-year period selected 
contains a good number of patents
subject to nonobviousness findings-1
0 2 patents from district court
cases and 72 from the USPTO. Furthermore, 
while information from
the 1980s and 1990s is nice, the focus 
of the current debate is on the
Federal Circuit's recent jurisprudence. 
It matters little what the
court's take on nonobviousness was 
twenty years ago. The important
question is what is the Federal Circuit's 
attitude toward nonobvious-
ness now, and this study defines its 
population in a way to best capture
and test the current jurisprudence.
Another potential problem with the 
study is that the population
should be expanded to include district 
court cases, decisions by the
USPTO's Board of Patent Appeals 
and Interferences (the Board), and
even reasons allowances by individual 
USPTO examiners. Looking at
all of these determinations of nonobviousness 
would provide the
complete picture of the current state 
of the doctrine.
8 2 In addition,
those cases heard by the Federal 
Circuit, particularly from the
USPTO, are a small fraction of 
the nonobviousness determinations
made in the United States on patent 
applications. Such appeals are
80 Such a division is the same as that 
identified by Professors Allison and 
Lemley
in their validity study. See id. at 202-05.
81 Professors Petherbridge and Wagner 
attempt to overcome this limitation 
in
their study, including cases from 1990 
to 2005. Petherbridge & Wagner, supra 
note 5
(manuscript at 22). However, their study 
does not expand over the full period of 
the
Federal Circuit's existence and include 
the case law before the court's creation,
hampering its ability to obtain a "complete" 
picture of nonobviousness. Id. Other
empirical studies have attempted to do just 
that, but either do not include recent data
or focus only on district court cases. See, 
e.g., Lunney, supra note 15, at 370-75 (focus-
ing on eight time periods with 1994-1995 
being the most recent); McEldowney, supra
note 59, at 22-28 (focusing on district 
court opinions).
82 A recent study by McEldowney, mentioned 
earlier, examines district court
cases. See McEldowney, supra note 59, at 
[ 22-28.
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also self-selecting, influenced by decisions by litigators and patent
examiners, all of which arguably pollute the integrity of the data col-
lected from these cases.
These are all valid points, and a more complete study, particularly
one that focuses on nonobviousness decisions made inside the
USPTO, would provide an especially valuable insight into how the
doctrine is really used in the patent system. But this study focuses on
what recent reports, the KSR case, and most patent players focus on-
recent decisions by the Federal Circuit. Reported and published deci-
sions, particularly those by an appellate court, both directly and indi-
rectly shape both one's understanding and expectations of the law.
8 3
The nature of the common law and stare decisis requires lower tribu-
nals to pay attention to and follow the precedent of appellate courts . 4
Furthermore, published decisions by an appellate court are some of
the only views would-be litigants have as to how their disputes may be
decided, and thus inform their actions under the law.85 This is all
particularly true in the case of patent law and the Federal Circuit,
where the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over all patent
appeals', and has been referred to, on more than one occasion, as the
"Supreme Court of patent law."'8 7 Put simply, this study focuses on the
Federal Circuit for the same reason recent criticism, the Supreme
Court in KSR, and patent players are focused on the Federal Circuit-
the court's opinions set the tone for patent law in the United States.
83 Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 807, 826
(1999) ("An important function of written published judicial opinions is to shape
future litigants' expectations and predictions about what might happen if their case
should proceed to trial. Moreover, these expectations and predictions in turn influ-
ence the nuanced decisional analyses about whether to even initiate, let alone litigate,
potential legal claims.").
84 See Pintip Hompluem Dunn, Note, How Judges Overrule: Speech Act Theory and the
Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE L.J. 493, 498 (2003) (noting that "in the common
law . . . the only texts that judges can reference are the texts of earlier judicial
opinions").
85 See Ahmed E. Taha, Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their Time, 6
AM. L. & ECON. REv. 1, 2 (2004) (concluding that "the small percentage of judges'
decisions that are published are responsible for changes in law and for most observ-
ers' perceptions of the federal court system"); id. at 7 ([P] ublished decisions are more
likely to be read and cited by the legal community.").
86 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000). The court's exclusivity in the area has been
eroded. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, "Arising Under"Jurisdiction and Unifornity in
Patent Law, 9 MIcH. TELECOMM. & TEcti. L. REV. 253 (2003) (discussing the effect of
the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,
535 U.S. 826 (2002)).
87 Donald S. Chisum, The Supreme Court and Patent Law: Does Shallow Reasoning
Lead to Thin Law?, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. Rrv. 1, 2 (1999).
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2. Inherent Limitations
There are other limitations to this study that are not directly
attributable to the population selected. The first limitation is the
study's inability to determine the "correct" result in each of the non-
obviousness decisions collected. A complete study that wanted to see
if the Federal Circuit truly lowered the nonobviousness requirement
would collect nonobviousness decisions and compare their results to
the correct result under a proper standard for a given set of facts. A
lowered requirement would result in a significantly lower number of
findings of obviousness in reported decisions as compared to the cor-
rect decision for those cases.
Put frankly, such an inquiry on a large scale does not appear pos-
sible. Nonobviousness is a very fact-intensive inquiry that depends on
the technologies involved and the skill level of those of ordinary skill
in the art.88 The doctrine's "intensely fact-dependent nature .. .
makes it difficult to determine whether a decision . . is incorrect."89
This is not to say that it is impossible to arrive at a correct nonobvious-
ness decision. It just means that in order to empirically test the cor-
rectness of each Federal Circuit decision, one would need an
incredible level of expertise in various technologies and a tremendous
amount of time.
Another limitation to this study pertains to its predictive power,
or lack thereof. As noted by Professors Allison and Lemley in their
validity study, "even the best predictive efforts in this area encounter
fundamental limitations imposed by the fact that law and the litigation
process change over time."90 This study can describe, and attempt to
predict, what happened over the four years of collected data. The
information it provides outside that four-year period, particularly
going forward, should be taken with caution. Things can, and do,
change. However, this study is making the same predictions recent
reports and arguments before the Supreme Court in KSR are mak-
ing-indicating what the Federal Circuit has done and that this will be
what it continues to do in the future.91
In the end, this study's main goal is to provide a clearer picture of
the recent case law that was. The Article will make inferences as to
88 Sr," In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987-88 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
89 Meara, supra note 50, at 280; see also Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18
(1966) (noting that "[w] hat is obvious is not a question upon which there is likely to
be uniformity of thought in every given factual context").
90 Allison & Lemley, supra note 56, at 205.
91 See supra Part I.B.
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what this case law means for what will 
be. But, these inferences will, in
the end, be simply that-inferences.
III. REsULTS OF THE STUDY
Using the population and data set defined 
in Part II, this Article
tests the current assertion that the Federal 
Circuit reduced the nonob-
viousness requirement and that the suggestion 
test is the cause of this
reduction. This assertion is tested 
in two ways. First, a macro-level
view of the Federal Circuit's recent 
nonobviousness jurisprudence is
taken. All of the opinions over the 
study's four-year period that
include any determination on the 
issue of nonobviousness are
examined. The macro-level study takes 
note of the Federal Circuit's
final decision for each patent-findings 
of either nonobvious or obvi-
ous-and whether the decision affirms, 
reverses, or vacates the lower
tribunal's decision. The study makes 
the assumption that if the Fed-
eral Circuit has lowered the nonobviousness 
bar, one would expect
more findings of nonobvious than obvious 
and, similarly, significantly
more affirmances of nonobvious than obvious.
92 Put another way, the
court's behavior would evidence a 
bias towards lower court and
USPTO decisions of finding a patent 
claim nonobvious.
Then a micro-level study is performed, 
where, instead of merely
looking at outcomes for each patent, 
the reasoning of the decisions
on nonobviousness over the study's 
four-year period is explored.
93
Specifically, the importance of the suggestion 
test to nonobviousness
determinations is examined. In cases 
where the Federal Circuit finds
the claimed invention nonobvious, or 
reverses or vacates a finding of
obvious, the decision is read to see if the 
suggestion test prompted this
outcome. The study tries to capture how 
outcome determinative the
suggestion test is in nonobviousness 
findings. The suggestion test's
impact on nonobviousness determinations 
on summary judgment is
also investigated.
Both the macro- and micro-level studies 
are described and ana-
lyzed in turn, focusing first on 
appeals from patent infringement 
cases
and then on appeals from the USPTO.
92 The validity of this assumption will be 
discussed in detail below. See infra notes
108-11 and accompanying text.
93 The "micro-level" study basically performs 
content analysis of the opinions in
the database, looking at the specific 
analysis on each patent at issue. Professors
Petherbridge and Wagner pioneered 
the use of the technique in patent law. 
See R.
Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is 
the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical 
Assess-
ment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1105 (2004).
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A. Does the Federal Circuit Employ a Low Nonobviousness Requirement?
Results From the Macro-Level Study
This macro-look at the Federal Circuit's nonobviousnessjurispru-
dence attempts to inform the discussion on whether the Federal Cir-
cuit has relaxed the nonobviousness requirement in the following
manner. First, the affirmance, reversal, and vacation rates over the
past four years for appeals from findings of nonobvious are compared
to those from findings of obvious. If the court has lowered the bar,
one would expect a statistically significant difference between the way
the Federal Circuit handles nonobvious findings as compared to obvi-
ous findings. The Federal Circuit would favor, and thus affirm more
often, findings of nonobvious and disfavor, and thus reverse or vacate
more often, findings of obvious.94 In addition, the lowering of the
nonobviousness bar would also present itself in the aggregation of the
holdings by the court in these cases-with findings of nonobvious out-
numbering findings of obvious.95
1. Appeals from Patent Infringement Cases
In appeals from patent infringement cases, there were 199 pat-
ents that were the subject of a final judgment regarding their validity.
Of these 199 final validity decisions, sixty-seven were final determina-
tions on the issue of nonobviousness. Added to these sixty-seven final
determinations were fifteen patents whose finding of nonobvious was
vacated and twenty patents whose findings of obvious were vacated.
With these added to the population, there were a total of 102 patents
that were subjected to some determination on the issue of nonobvi-
ousness over the study's four-year period. Of these 102 patents:
(1) 47.05% (forty-eight) were the subject of a lower court finding
of nonobvious while 52.94% (fifty-four) were the subject of a lower
court finding of obvious; 96
94 Notably, this comparison and statistical test of this comparison was not per-
formed by Professors Petherbridge and Wagner. Their study simply reported the
aggregate of affirmances, reversals, and vacations because their goal was to determine
doctrinal stability, not the level of the nonobviousness standard. Petherbridge & Wag-
ner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 31-33).
95 Again, the various limitations to this assumption-a difference in nonobvious
and obvious holdings indicates the level of the nonobviousness standard-will be dis-
cussed in detail below. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
96 The almost even spread between lower court decisions finding a patent claim
nonobvious and those finding a patent claim obvious falls right in line with Professors
Priest and Klein's model. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-17 (1984) (defining what has come to be known
as the fifty-percent rule). It also comes close to the observed overall validity rate by
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(2) 62.5% (thirty) of the nonobvious determinations were
affirmed by the Federal Circuit, while 6.25% (three) were reversed
and 31.25% (fifteen) were vacated; and
(3) 48.15% (twenty-six) of the obvious determinations were
affirmed by the Federal Circuit, while 12.96% (seven) were reversed
and 38.89% (twenty-one) were vacated.
Looking at the descriptive data, there appears to be a slight bias
favoring lower court nonobvious findings. The affirmance rate is
higher, and the reversal and vacation rate is lower as compared to
appeals from obvious findings. However, the question is whether this
difference is statistically significant. In order to determine whether it
is, a Fisher's Exact Test is performed on the data.97
Professors Allison and Lemley. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 56, at 205-06
(observing, from a set of 300 final validity decisions, 162 (54%) patents found valid
compared to 138 (46%) patents found invalid).
Of even further interest is comparing the even split observed in these recent
district court cases to the more lopsided distribution Professors Allison and Lemley
observed with regards to nonobviousness. While a fifty-fifty split was observed over
this study's four-year period, from 2002 to 2005, Professors Allison and Lemley
observed more findings of nonobvious, with 160 patents (63.7%) being found nonob-
vious and 58 patents (36.3%) being found obvious between 1989 to 1996. Id. at 209.
This suggests that at the district court level the likelihood of an obvious challenge
being successful has increased in recent years, at least as compared to the early to
mid-1990s.
97 A Fisher's Exact Test is chosen over the Pearson's Chi-Squared Test to measure
statistical significance because of the small population size and, sometimes, highly
unbalanced tables, produced by this study. B.S. EVERITr, THE ANALYSIS OF CONTIN-
GENCY TABLES 7, 15-16 (2d. ed 1992); GEORGE W. SNEDECOR & WILLIAM G. COCHRAN,
STATISTICAL METHODS 126-27 (8th ed. 1989) (explaining that the Fisher's Exact Test
is favored over the Chi-Squared Test for smaller expected frequencies).
Fisher's Exact Test requires a 2x2 table, and thus this study will use a 2x2 table,
with the nonobvious and obvious findings by the lower court defining the two rows
and the affirmance and reversal and vacation grouped together defining the two col-
umns. Reversal and vacation were grouped to accommodate the 2x2 table require-
ment. This grouping does not disturb the validity of the results for two reasons. First,
both indicate that the Federal Circuit negatively viewed the lower court's conclusion.
While one treatment, reversal, clearly goes to the substance of the determination,
vacation also indicates at least a slight view towards the substance of the nonobvious-
ness determination. Admittedly, the Federal Circuit could easily be vacating on
purely procedural grounds-there is still a genuine issue of material fact-when the
court may still substantively favor the lower court's outcome. See LG Elecs., Inc. v.
Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2006). But, a vacation is still a
negative treatment of the decision below and, if the court has lowered the nonobvi-
ousness standard, it would likely vacate more findings of obvious and less findings of
nonobvious.
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The results of the Fisher's Exact Test produced 
a p-value of
0.1668,98 indicating that the results did not show a 
significant differ-
ence between the Federal Circuit's handling 
of a lower court's finding
of nonobvious as compared to a finding of 
obvious. 99 Such a finding
suggests that there is no evidence of an inherent 
bias in the Federal
Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence that 
favors a finding of non-
obvious or obvious.
100 The nonobviousness requirement cannot 
be
significantly low because if it was, presumably 
the distribution would
be statistically significant and tilt towards 
affirmance of findings of
nonobvious. This result is interesting because 
it fails to support the
presently held belief that the court's 
jurisprudence favors finding
patent claims nonobvious.
A similar finding is made when looking at 
the ultimate holdings
in nonobviousness cases over the study's 
four-year period. During this
time period, the Federal Circuit held thirty-seven 
patents nonobvious,
twenty-nine patents obvious, and vacated 
the lower court's holding for
thirty-six patents. Figure 1, below, depicts this 
breakdown graphically.
98 This is the two-tail p-value. Another 
test for statistical significance, the Pear-
son's Chi-Squared Test, produced a p-value 
of 0.2102 for the same 2x2 matrix, con-
firming the results of the Fisher's Exact 
Test-there is no statistically significant
relationship between the lower court's 
finding on nonobviousness and the Federal
Circuit's affirmance or reversal or vacation 
of the finding. See generally MICHFAL 0.
FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS 
FOR LAWYERS 157-62 (2d ed. 2001) (describ-
ing the Pearson's Chi-Squared Test).
This finding was also confirmed when 
the. negative treatments of the lower
court's findings was represented individually, 
defining a 2x3 matrix with the reversals
and vacations separated. The p-value using 
the Chi-Squared Test produced a p-value
of 0.2808, indicating no significant difference.
99 For the distribution to be statistically 
significant, a p-value must be less than
.05. See DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 
484 (3d ed. 1998). A p-value less than .01
is considered highly statistically significant. 
Id.
100 The distribution is, instead, random, 
possibly mimicking the fifty-percent rule
that prompted close cases to go to trial 
and ultimately be appealed to the Federal
Circuit. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying 
text.
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FIGURE 1. FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S HOLDINGS ON NONORVIOUSNESS IN







The percentage of patents found nonobvious is only slightly
higher than those found obvious-36.27% compared to 28.43%.
Ignoring the vacations, there is close to an even split between findings
of nonobvious and obvious-56.06% compared to 43.93%. This
frequency fails to support the claim that the nonobviousness require-
ment has lowered significantly.
What makes this lack of a strong bias particularly remarkable is
the presumption of validity issued patents enjoy.10' A patent must be
found invalid not by just a preponderance of the evidence, but by
clear and convincing evidence.1 02 Scholars and the FTC Report point
to this heightened standard as one of the main reasons invalid patents
are found valid by courts. 0 3 A finding of nonobvious is therefore
101 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d
1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
102 Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting
that overcoming the presumption requires a showing of facts provided by clear and
convincing evidence).
103 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, at 8-10 (recommending legislation to
reduce the standard to preponderance of the evidence); Mark A. Lemley, Rational
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1497 (2001) (arguing that by
abolishing the strong presumption of validity, courts could make a more thorough
validity determination).
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heavily presumed, making an obvious finding by the Federal Circuit
inherently less likely regardless of the actual nonobviousness standard
employed. Because of this presumption, even a neutral nonobvious-
ness standard should produce a greater percentage of patents being
held nonobvious. The results of this study only mildly mimic the
presumption, with the split between valid and invalid closer to almost
fifty-fifty, suggesting that if any bias exists, it is a bias towards finding
patents obvious, not nonobvious as most critics suggest.
However, the conclusion that these results, an almost even distri-
bution between nonobvious and obvious findings, mean that the
nonobviousness standard has not been lowered must be qualified. By
looking at case outcomes, the study may simply be witnessing close
cases all centered around a low nonobviousness standard. Thus, the
study may say nothing about the level of the Federal Circuit's nonobvi-
ousness requirement.
As Professors George Priest and Benjamin Klein observed, liti-
gants will only go to trial if the facts present a close case. 10 4 If the case
is not close, rational parties will settle. 10° Since only close cases go to
trial, the predicted success rate for such cases is fifty percent for the
plaintiff and fifty percent for the defendant.10 6 This would indicate
that the cases that form the bases for this study are cases where the
issue of nonobviousness is close, suggesting that the Federal Circuit's
findings should break down the middle, with as many findings of non-
obvious as obvious. The study comes close to confirming this
postulation. 1
0 7
When evaluating whether to go to trial or not, litigants will likely
take into account such things as the current nonobviousness standard
and the presumption of validity. The only cases that reach the courts
are those that are, taking into account all of the prevailing legal stan-
dards, coin-flips for the given set of facts. Put another way, the cur-
rent legal standards, including the level of the nonobviousness
requirement, is subsumed in this decision calculus and thus does not
necessarily show up in the reported cases studied. If the nonobvious-
ness bar is low, then only those cases where it is a close call around
that low bar will be taken to trial and end up at the Federal Circuit. In
such an environment, the final results of this macro-level study can say
nothing about where the nonobviousness bar sits.
104 See Priest & Klein, supra note 96, at 9-17.
105 Id. at 17.
106 Id.
107 The district court results further confirm the fifty-percent rule on the issue of
nonobviousness. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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But this line of reasoning does not fully discount the significance
of the macro-level studies results. First, for this line of reasoning to
hold and a low nonobviousness standard to exist, all of the patents in
the study must hover around this lower nonobviousness standard and
are, as a result, invalid under the "correct" standard. Even the strong-
est critics of the Federal Circuit would be unlikely to make this claim.
All of the patents involved in this study are not "bad" patents. 0 8 Sec-
ond, this critique rests on the assumption that litigants have a good
understanding of exactly where the nonobviousness bar sits. That is,
that their behavior follows Professors Priest and Klein's theory to the
letter.'0l ' It has been observed that, in practice, the fifty-percent rule
does not hold true. 0 Finally, if the Federal Circuit had lowered the
nonobviousness bar, and these results simply record litigants' under-
standing of this lowering, the Federal Circuit would have to communi-
cate the lowering in some way. Finding more patents nonobvious as
opposed to obvious would be the likely vehicle through which to send
this message. As the results indicate, the message the Federal Circuit
has sent is that it is an even playing field, with patents as likely to be
found nonobvious as obvious.
Thus, a truly lowered bar or real bias towards finding patents
nonobvious would likely result in a greater number of findings of non-
obvious than obvious. This is not the case. The court's jurisprudence
appears to have not significantly pushed the doctrine towards one par-
ticular finding or another. The ultimate conclusion, that the nonobvi-
ousness requirement has not been lowered, cannot be conclusively
made based on the results of this macro-level study. But, the study, at
the very least, gives no indication that the opposite is true, as critics
argue-that the Federal Circuit has lowered the requirement.
This all being said, it is surprising, given the current discourse,
that an even distribution between findings of nonobvious and obvious
was observed."' Hopefully, the micro-level study' 12 will provide a bet-
108 See, e.g., Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs, Inc., 391 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(involving a patent on the transdermal administration of the narcotic drug fentanyl);
Atmel Corp. v. Silicon Storage Tech., Inc., 76 F. App'x 298, 300 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(considering a patent on a programmable semiconductor memory chip).
109 See Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Tial: An Empirical Study of Predictors
of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 315, 322-23 (1999) (noting that Priest and
Klein's model "predicts that the close cases will be tried").
110 See David Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Mul-
timodel Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 248-249
(1996).
111 Professors Petherbridge and Wagner make a similar observation, albeit in pass-
ing. See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 41-42) (finding a
higher frequency of obvious findings (57.8%) as compared to nonobvious findings
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ter insight as to whether the bar has been lowered by focusing on the
alleged cause of this lowering-the suggestion test.
2. Appeals from the USPTO
In appeals from the Board of the USPTO, there were seventy-two
applications and issued patents that were the subject of a final deter-
mination regarding patentability or validity. Of these seventy-two
appealed patents and patent applications, fifty involved final determi-
nations on the issue of nonobviousness. Added to these fifty final
determinations, there were four patent applications whose findings of
obviousness were vacated and remanded. With these decisions added
to the population, there were a total of fifty-four patents and patent
applications that were subjected to some determination on the issue
of nonobviousness over the four-year period of the study. Of these
fifty-four patents and patent applications:
(1) all, 100% (one), of the nonobvious determinations were
affirmed by the Federal Circuit; and
(2) 86.79% (forty-six) of the obvious determinations were
affirmed by the Federal Circuit, while 5.66% (three) were reversed
and 7.55% (four) were vacated.
These data indicate that the Federal Circuit has not lowered the
nonobviousness bar with respect to the USPTO over the four-year
period. The high affirmance rate of findings of nonobvious is particu-
larly telling. The descriptive statistics show that the Federal Circuit's
nonobviousness jurisprudence represents little to no obstacle to
affirming findings of obvious by the USPTO. When looking at the
outcome in all of the nonobviousness cases appealed from the
USPTO, the percentage of patent, or patent applications, found obvi-
ous by the Federal Circuit is extremely high. Figure 2, below, depicts
the final tally:
(42.4%)). The difference between this study's findings and Petherbridge and Wag-
ner's may be explained by the period of time over which the samples were collected
or the inclusion of Rule 36 cases in this study. Regardless of the reason, Pi-ofessor
Petherbridge and Wagner's finding of an almost even split validates this study's
results.
112 See infra Part III.B.I.
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FiGuRE 2. FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S HOLDINGS ON
NONOBVIOUSNESS IN APP&ALS FROM THE USPTO
Of further interest, the high rate of affirmance of obvious find-
ings (86.79%) stands in stark contrast to the similar statistic in the
patent infringement case setting (48.15%). This indicates that the
Federal Circuit is even more likely to find a claim obvious in an appeal
from the USPTO than a district court. The statistical significance of
this difference is testable by performing a Fisher's Exact Test on the
handling of appeals from findings of obvious by district courts and the
USPTO. The result is a p-value of .0000266, indicating a highly statis-
tically significant difference. USPTO obvious findings are more likely
to be affirmed than similar findings by district courts.
This difference can arguably be explained by the differing stan-
dards of review and the varying presumptions between the two types
of appeals. First, appeals from the USPTO are reviewed under the
Administrative Procedure Act's standard of review."13 The ultimate
nonobviousness determination is a question of law, and thus reviewed
de novo by the Federal Circuit.' 14 But the underlying factual determi-
nations are reviewed for substantial evidence, a more deferential stan-
dard then those applied to summary judgments or JMOLs by district
113 See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 164-65 (1999).
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courts.' 15 This greater deference applied to all USPTO's fact findings
could explain the higher rate of affirmance of obvious determina-
tions. To add to this, most of the appeals from the USPTO involve
patent applications, as opposed to already issued patents, that are not
subject to the same strong presumption of validity as in district
court.' 6 Finding a patent application invalid is thus much easier than
finding an issued patent invalid, making it easier for the Federal
Circuit to agree with a USPTO's conclusion of obvious.
However, the FTC and NRC reports and the briefing in support
of certiorari in KSR argue that Federal Circuit jurisprudence has
made it particularly more difficult for the USPTO to find patent appli-
cations obvious.1 7 If this assertion was true, one would expect a
higher degree of reversal of USPTO findings by the Federal Circuit.
Or, at the very least, that this lowering of the nonobviousness bar
would counteract the standard of review's and lack of a presumption's
push towards affirming a USPTO finding of obvious. This is clearly
not the case, with 86.79% of the USPTO's findings of obvious being
affirmed. The current thinking that the USPTO cannot, under the
current law, properly find a patent application invalid does not appear
to be supported.' 1
But, as with the district court results, these results may provide
little insight into whether the Federal Circuit has lowered the nonob-
viousness requirement. First, appeals from the USPTO do not tell the
full story. The alleged disparate impact of the Federal Circuit's juris-
prudence, particularly In re Song-Su Lee,' 1 9 may still be observed at the
Board level, or the individual examination level. That is, the USPTO's
hands may truly be tied by the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence and the
result is the issuance of obvious patents that are never reviewed by the
Federal Circuit.1 20 The number of patent applications from the
115 Compare In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1313-16 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (establishing
the substantial evidence standard of review for appeals of facts from the USPTO), with
Hilgraeve Corp. v. McAfee Assocs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting
that summary judgments are reviewed de novo).
116 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir, 2004)
("The general presumption of patent validity does not pertain to patent applications
before they issue.").
117 See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
118 Professors Petherbridge and Wagner come to a similar conclusion, but in a
different manner, looking at the rate of reversal of USPTO decisions. Petherbridge &
Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 37-38).
119 277 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (requiring the USPTO to provide
concrete evidence to support its conclusion of obvious).
120 The Board, or other parts of the USPTO, does not have the power to appeal
the issuance of a patent. Only an aggrieved inventor whose patent application has
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USPTO the Federal Circuit sees, and finds 
invalid, may be dwarfed by
the number of patent applications 
"improperly" granted by the
USPTO because of the Federal Circuit's case law.
The USPTO may also be operating under 
the lower standard, and
thus the cases coming up to the Federal 
Circuit have already taken the
standard into account. This masks 
the ability for the study to tease
out, from final holdings, the level of 
the nonobviousness standard.
The inability of the USPTO to appeal 
close cases also hampers the
study's ability to provide any insight 
into the court's jurisprudence.
But, in light of this high affirmance 
rate, patent applicants would
only go through the cost of appealing 
in those cases where they think
they have a good chance of winning)
2 1 Patent applicants would be
appealing stronger and stronger 
cases of nonobvious, testing the
height, or strength, of the standard. 
And even under this scenario,
the affirmance rate stays high, creating 
a viable inference that the
Federal Circuit is keeping the nonobviousness 
standard stiff, at least in
the context of the USPTO.
The high affirmance rate would, 
in turn, have the opposite effect
on the USPTO. The study shows 
that the LJSPTO sees a high affirm-
ance rate of its findings of obvious. 
This sends a message to the Board
and individual examiners that such 
findings of patent claims as obvi-
ous are supported, and that the support 
is strong. The USPTO is just
as likely to push in the other direction, 
feeling more and more com-
fortable finding the close case obvious. 
Both of these reactions would
create a pool of appealed cases from 
the USPTO that are testing how
high the nonobviousness standard 
can get, not how low.
The very high affirmance rate in 
response, thus, tells more than
the results from district court cases. 
These results bring the assertion
that the nonobviousness standard 
has been lowered into greater ques-
tion. It also contradicts the specific 
assertion made by critics-that
the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence 
is particularly harmful to the
USPTO. These data indicate that 
the USPTO, at least at the Federal
Circuit level, does not have a particularly 
difficult time successfully
proving a patent claim obvious. 
In addition, these findings may
become more telling when combined 
with the micro-level study that
tests whether the bar has been lowered 
by the suggestion test.
been rejected may appeal the rejection 
to the Federal Circuit. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 141
(Supp. I1 2003).
121 The average cost of appealing 
a patent application to the Board in 
2005 was
$8,495. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
LAW Ass'N, REPORT OF TiE 
ECONOMIC SURVEY, at
1-98 (2005). While this cost may seem 
small, it may almost double the cost 
of patent
prosecution in some cases. See id. 
at 1-95 (noting that the average cost 
of filing a
patent application is $11,218).
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B. Does the Federal Circuit's "Suggestion Test" Lower the Nonobviousness
Requirement? Results From the Micro-Level Study
In addition to testing whether there is a general bias towards
nonobvious findings or a lowering of the bar in the Federal Circuit's
nonobviousness case law, the study also investigates the impact of the
court's suggestion test. Two specific claims regarding the suggestion
test are investigated. First, this "micro-level"' 22 part of the study tests
whether the suggestion test causes most, if not all, nonobvious find-
ings. Put another way, it examines whether the suggestion test actu-
ally operates as a one-way ratchet in most nonobviousness cases.
Second, this part of the study examines whether the suggestion test
hinders the ability for nonobviousness determinations to be made on
summary judgment.
In order to gain information on whether the Federal Circuit actu-
ally uses the suggestion test, this micro-level part of the study first
focuses on cases in which the Federal Circuit either affirmed a finding
of nonobvious or reversed or vacated a finding of obvious over the
four-year period. The study focuses on these opinions because they
are the only cases where the suggestion test could have prompted a
finding favoring a conclusion of nonobvious. The study will then
consider the procedural mechanism through which the findings on
nonobviousness were made by the tribunal below-summary judg-
ment, JMOL, jury trial, or bench trial-and how the Federal Circuit
handled the lower court's decision. As with the macro-level study,
appeals from patent infringement cases are considered first, then
appeals from the USPTO. 123
122 This part of the study is identified as "micro-level" because more data is taken
than just the outcome for each individual patent. The specific reasoning of the deci-
sion causing that particular outcome is examined and recorded. This low-level look at
a court's decisions-one termed "micro-level" but also known as content analysis-
has been done before in the patent context and in other areas of law. See, e.g., Pether-
bridge & Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 5-20); Mark A. Hall & Ronald F.
Wright, Systematic Content Analysis ofJudicial Opinions, (Wake Forest Univ. Legal Stud-
ies Paper No. 913336, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913336 (advocat-
ing the use of a content-based method of evaluating caselaw).
123 However, for this part of the study, appeals from the USPTO will be ignored
when looking into the suggestion test's impact on summary judgment because there is
no directly equivalent mechanism in the USPTO. All USPTO decisions that get to the
Federal Circuit have gone through full adjudication.
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1. The Suggestion Test as the Cause of Nonobvious Findings
a. Appeals in Patent Infringement Cases
In the study's population of patent infringement cases, there
were thirty patents for which the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of
nonobvious, seven patents where a finding of obvious was reversed,
and twenty-one patents where a finding of obvious was vacated. In
total, there were fifty-eight patents for which the Federal Circuit either
ultimately found the patent claims nonobvious or vacated a finding of
obvious. This universe of opinions includes the only instances in
which the suggestion test could have prompted a conclusion of non-
obvious or denied a conclusion of obvious.12
4
The opinions concerning these patents were examined to deter-
mine the reasoning employed by the Federal Circuit to support its
final holding. 2 5 The reasoning was coded based on the part of the
nonobviousness analysis upon which the court relied to come to its
conclusion. The codes included:
(1) failure to meet the suggestion test;
(2) secondary considerations rebutted a prima facie case of
obvious;
(3) elements of the claimed invention were not in the prior art;
(4) claim interpretation was incorrect;
(5) other reason; 126 or
(6) unknown.
12 7
After looking at these data, another code was created for
instances where both the litigants failed to meet the suggestion test
124 There are twenty-nine other patents where the suggestion test clearly did not
cause a finding of nonobvious. These include twenty-six affirmances of a finding of
obvious and three reversals of a finding of nonobvious. These twenty-ninre patents are
instances where the suggestion test did not act as a one-way ratchet and force a find-
ing of nonobvious. More will be discussed about these additional findings below. See
infra text accompanying notes 131-32.
125 Professors Petherbridge and Wagner, while looking at the result of the use of
the suggestion test, do not investigate its specific usage in findings favoring nonobvi-
ousness. Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 43-49). Obtaining
and analyzing this additional data gives a fuller and more useful picture of the Federal
Circuit current nonobviousness doctrine.
126 In most instances, the "other reasons" were procedural. See, e.g., Catalina
Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d 1277, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming a
holding of nonobvious because the defendant failed to preserve the right to appeal
the nonobviousness issue).
127 The unknowns included all of the Rule 36 opinions where a finding of nonob-
vious was affirmed, but the conclusory nature of the ruling shed no light as to why the
court affirmed the holding.
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and secondary considerations rebutted a prima facie case.' 28 The
results of this coding are represented graphically below in Figure 3.129
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The descriptive statistics can be further categorized to gain a bet-
ter handle on the extent to which the suggestion test causes a finding,
or possible finding, of nonobvious. All of those findings based, at
least in part, on a failure to meet the suggestion test are combined,I - ,,
and all other findings, other than those whose reasoning is unknown,
are combined. The results of this combination are depicted below, in
Figure 4.
128 This is, most likely, an example of "piling on" by the court. See, e.g., PIN/NIP,
Inc. v. Patte Chem. Co., 304 F.3d 1235, 1245-47 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
129 The results in Figure 3 are normalized to the complete universe of patent
appeals from district courts where nonobviousness was at issue. Thus, the results are
depicted as percentages of this complete population-102 patents.
130 There were instances, as shown in Figure 3, where the Federal Circuit found
the suggestion test not met and found the presence of secondary considerations that
the patent claim was nonobvious.
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FIGURE 4. REASON FOR AFFIRMING A 
FINDING OF NONOBVIOUS OR








Disregarding the findings whose reasoning 
is unknown, there
exists an even split between those 
cases where the suggestion test
prompts a nonobvious-oriented finding 
and those cases where some-
thing else prompts such a finding. 
The suggestion test, it would there-
fore seem, plays a major role in the 
Federal Circuit's nonobviousness
jurisprudence.
The suggestion test does not, however, 
play as great of a role as
critics suggest. In almost as many situations 
a patent is found nonobvi-
ous because an element of the claimed 
invention is not found in the
prior art, a part of the nonobviousness 
inquiry expressly established in
Graham."' The suggestion test is a 
one-way ratchet by definition-it
must be met to find a claim obvious. 
But it does not act as one in at
least 43.1% of those cases where the 
court found the claim nonobvi-
ous or vacated a finding of obvious. 
The results show that the sugges-
tion test is a big factor in nonobvious 
findings, but it is not an
overwhelming factor.
To put the suggestion test's impact in 
complete perspective,
those cases where a lack of suggestion 
is found can be compared to
both cases where there is another basis 
to support a finding of nonob-
vious and those cases where the court 
actually finds the claim obvious.
131 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 
U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
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This additional category, cases where the Federal Circuit finds the
claim obvious, is another instance where the suggestion test did not
force a finding of nonobvious. With these additional findings, twenty-
six affirmances of obvious findings and three reversals of nonobvious
findings, the role of the suggestion test in modern Federal Circuit
jurisprudence becomes smaller.
The suggestion test, therefore, prompted a finding of nonobvi-
ous, or vacation of a finding of obvious, for twenty-five patents
compared to fifty-four patents where the suggestion test clearly played
no role. Over the past four years, for every one patent where the sug-
gestion test dictated the decision, two patents were not influenced by
the test. The suggestion test does not influence the final nonobvious-
ness decision in nearly the number of cases suggested by recent
criticism.
This finding becomes even more interesting when combined with
the almost even frequency of ultimate findings of nonobvious and
obvious discussed in Part III.A.1 There, the results were discounted
because litigants could have been operating under the lowered non-
obviousness bar, bringing cases that assumed a lower standard would
be applied. Critics assert that this lower standard is created by the
suggestion test, but the results of the micro-level study indicate that
the suggestion test does not play as large of a role. Litigants, reading
the Federal Circuit case law over this four year period, would not
come away with the impression that the suggestion test drives the deci-
sion in most nonobviousness cases. If the suggestion test is the alleged
cause of the lowered nonobviousness requirement, the Federal Cir-
cuit's case law is not adequately sending that message to patent play-
ers. These results, therefore, call into question the discounting of the
results in Part III.A.1 It possibly revives the initial inference from the
almost even split in nonobvious to obvious outcomes-that the non-
obviousness requirement has not been lowered.
One final observation of interest needs to be made. This part of
the study also uncovered the miniscule role secondary considerations
play in the Federal Circuit nonobviousness jurisprudence. In only
one instance were secondary considerations by themselves the reason
for a holding, and it was only to vacate a lower court's holding of
obvious.13 2 In the four other patents where secondary considerations
were used to support the court's decision, the court also relied upon a
132 See Display Techs., Inc. v. Paul Flum Ideas, Inc., 282 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
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failure to meet the suggestion test to support its conclusion.133 These
results confirm those of Professor Mandel, who also concluded that
secondary considerations play a very insignificant role in nonobvious-
ness jurisprudence. 134 This finding is of interest because it brings into
question some of the criticism of the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence
centered on secondary considerations.
135
b. Appeals from the USPTO
The study turned up fewer relevant data points to perform the
same inquiry as done above-looking at the suggestion test's effect on
affirmances of nonobvious findings and reversals and vacations of
obvious findings by the USPTO. There were only eight such patents
that fell into these categories and in five of them failing the suggestion
test was the reason for the court's conclusion. Three of the patents
were found nonobvious or remanded on other grounds.
The lack of data is not surprising given that mainly findings of
obvious are appealed from the USPTO and the affirmance rate of
such findings by the Federal Circuit is very high.156 The high affirm-
ance of obvious findings by the USPTO indicates that the suggestion
test represents even less of an obstacle in USPTO cases. The Federal
Circuit allowed the suggestion test to be met and patents held obvious
for forty-six patents on appeal from the USPTO. Thus, in total, the
suggestion test did not force a finding of nonobvious in forty-nine
(90.74%) of the fifty-four patents appealed from the USPTO.
However, the whole story does not show up in the population
studied. As previously mentioned, there are very limited instances in
which the court will see appeals from the issuance of patents. 37 A
high number of situations could, and most likely do, exist where the
suggestion test prompted a finding of nonobvious and resulted in the
allowance of a patent application. This study, because of the parame-
ters chosen, does not have the ability to take into account the com-
plete usage of the suggestion test at the USPTO level.
133 See Knoll Pharm. Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 367 F.3d 1381, 1384-85 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d
1186, 1196-1197 (Fed. Cir. 2003); PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chem. Co., 304 F.3d 1235,
1247-48 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Neupak, Inc. v. Ideal Mfg. & Sales Corp., 41 F. App'x. 435,
439-40 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
134 See Mandel, Empirical Demonstration, supra note 28, at 1422-25.
135 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, at ch. 4, at 15-19 (asserting that the
Federal Circuit's implementation of the secondary consideration of "commercial
success" improperly lowers the nonobviousness requirement).
136 See supra Part III.A.2.
137 See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (Supp. III 2003).
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This being said, the Federal Circuit's attitude toward, and usage
of, the suggestion test sets the tone for the USPTO's usage of the test.
Like district courts, the USPTO is guided by Federal Circuit case law.
The Federal Circuit, through its high affirmance rate and agreement
in most cases that the suggestion test is met, signals to the USPTO that
patent applications can be found obvious and that those findings will
be supported. The suggestion test definitely plays a role in the
USPTO's nonobviousness analysis. But, based on the results of this
study, it does not automatically result in a conclusion of nonobvious in
most cases. These findings, when combined with those in Part III.A.2
of the study, indicate that the nonobviousness requirement has not
been lowered with respect to the USPTO and that the suggestion test
may not restrict the USPTO as much as critics indicate.
2. The Suggestion Test as a Barrier to Summary Judgment
The Federal Circuit's suggestion test is also criticized as being an
obstacle to summary judgment on nonobviousness. Attempts to
resolve issues of nonobviousness on summary judgment are thwarted
by the need to determine whether a suggestion is present or not.13 1
The argument is that since the suggestion test is a factual inquiry, 39 it
will always present a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial to
resolve. This micro-level part of the study is continued to test this
assertion.
Since this inquiry focuses on summary judgment, only appeals
from patent infringement cases are examined.1 40 All 102 patents
where the issue of nonobviousness was on appeal are included, with
initial attention to how the nonobviousness issue was disposed of by
the trial court and how the Federal Circuit handled this disposition on
appeal. There were four types of dispositions observed in the popula-
tion. Two were decisions as a matter of law-summary judgments and
JMOLs-and two were factual findings-bench trial verdicts and jury
verdicts.1 41 The descriptive statistics are as follows:
138 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
139 See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665 (Fed. Cir. 2000). "'Determining
whether there is a suggestion or motivation to modify a prior art reference is one
aspect of determining the scope and content of the prior art, a fact question subsidi-
ary to the ultimate conclusion of obviousness.'" Id. (quoting SIBIA Neurosciences,
Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
140 There is no equivalent to summary judgment in patent examination by the
USPTO. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. SUNG & JEFF E. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW HANDBOoK
§ 11:1 (2005-2006 ed.).
141 Both of these latter categories-bench trials and jury verdicts-included deni-
als by the district court of requests for judgments as a matter of law.
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(1) the Federal Circuit affirmed 39.02% 
(sixteen) of the
appealed summary judgments, while 
it reversed 0% (zero) of them
and vacated 60.98% (twenty-five) of them;
(2) the Federal Circuit affirmed 0% 
(zero) of the appealed
JMOLs, while it reversed 55.56% (five) 
of them and vacated 44.44%
(four) of them;
(3) the Federal Circuit affirmed 
70.83% (seventeen) of the
appealed bench trial verdicts, while 
it reversed 12.5% (three) of them
and vacated 16.67% (four) of them; 
and
(4) the Federal Circuit affirmed 82.14% 
(twenty-three) of the
appealed jury verdicts, while it reversed 
7.14% (two) of them and
vacated 10.71% (three) of them.
Looking at the descriptive statistics 
alone, a clear difference in
the court's handling of judgments 
becomes noticeable. Determina-
tions made outside the full fact finding 
setting-either by summary
judgment or as aJMOL-are heavily 
vacated or reversed. In contrast,
the affirmance rate for judgments that 
result from full fact finding-
either by trial before a jury or before 
a judge-is very high.
Statistical testing supports this casual 
observation. A Fisher Exact
Test results in a p-value of 0.0000086, 
indicating the differences are
highly statistically significant.
1 42 This relationship holds true when
analyzing the court's disposition of 
only cases where the lower court
found the patent claim nonobvious 
and only cases where the lower
court found the patent claim obvious.
The data for only those appeals from 
decisions finding the patent
nonobvious are reproduced below:
142 To increase the validity of the 
test, statistics were combined in a logical 
fashion
to create a 2x2 table. The two judgments 
as a matter of law-summary judgment 
and
JMOL-were combined as were the 
two factfinding based judgments-bench 
trial
and jury trial verdicts. Furthermore, 
affirmances were viewed as positive 
treatments of
the lower court's judgment and reversals 
and vacations were grouped together 
and
considered negative treatments of 
the lower court's judgment.
NONOBVIOUSNESS AND THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
FIGURE 5. HOLDING FOR APPEALS FROM 
A FINDING OF
NONOBVIOUS IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
DECISIONS
just focusing on appeals from findings of 
nonobvious, there is
still a significant statistical relationship between 
outcome and the type
of lower court judgment. A Fisher's Exact 
Test produces a p-value of
0.01434. The Federal Circuit is more 
likely to affirm a factual finding
of the lower court as opposed to a legal 
one, even when the finding at
issue is one of nonobvious.
A similar result is found when looking 
at only lower court judg-
ments of obvious. The data from the 
study are reproduced below:
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FIGURE 6. HOLDING FOR APPEALS FROM A FINDING OF














A Fisher's Exact Test produces a p-value of 0.00083, indicating a
highly statistically significant relationship between the type of judg-
ment and the Federal Circuit's affirmance or reversal or vacation of a
finding of obvious.
Another observation of import can be made from these data.
The Federal Circuit decisions evidence the same bias in favor of
bench trial and jury trial verdicts for both findings of nonobvious and
obvious. Such a result is not surprising given the differing standard of
review applied to these types ofjudgments. A grant of summary judg-
ment is reviewed de novo,143 and a grant of JMOL is reviewed under
the same standard the district court applied-whether no substantial
evidence supported the jury's verdict. 144 Both of these standards give
the Federal Circuit great leeway in reversing or vacating the lower
court's judgment. Factual findings made as the result of a bench trial
are reviewed for clear error14 5 and those made as a result of jury ver-
dict are reviewed for substantial evidence146 These standards are
more deferential to the lower court's finding and thus restrict the
scope of the Federal Circuit's review.
143 See Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
144 See SIBIA Neurosciences, 225 F.3d at 1354.
145 See Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 365 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
146 See TI Group Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126,
1133 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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This result further supports an earlier conclusion in Part III.A.1,
that the Federal Circuit is not biased towards a finding of nonobvious
or obvious. If a bias, or a lowering of the nonobviousness require-
ment, did exist, then this bias would result in affirmances of such find-
ings regardless of how, procedurally, the lower courts made them. A
bias towards one or the other would have disturbed the general rela-
tionship between type of judgment and affirmance or reversal or vaca-
tion. It did not.
But these results beg the question as to the suggestion test's
impact on these findings. Is the reason for such a high vacation of
summary judgment determinations the existence of the suggestion
test? A closer look at the cases where a summary judgment was on
appeal is taken.
Sixteen of the forty-one summary judgments on appeal were
affirmed by the Federal Circuit, eight of which were affirmances of
summary judgments of nonobvious and the other eight affirmances of
summary judgments of obvious. For these sixteen, the suggestion test
was clearly not an obstacle to summary judgment considering the sum-
mary judgments in those cases were both granted by the lower court
and allowed to stand. The question becomes how the suggestion test
operated in the other twenty-five cases where the Federal Circuit
vacated the summary judgment below.
Codings similar to those used in Part III.B.1 are used, looking to
see if the vacation was due to a factual issue regarding the suggestion
test or some other grounds. The results are as follows:
(1) 28.0% (seven) of the twenty-five vacated summary judgments
were vacated because of factual issues related to the suggestion test;
(2) 28.0% (seven) of the twenty-five vacated summary judgments
were vacated because of factual issues related to the contents of the
prior art;
(3) 28.0% (seven) of the twenty-five vacated summary judgments
were vacated because of erroneous claim constructions; and
(4) 16.0% (four) of the twenty-five vacated summary judgments
were vacated because of some other reason. 47
The suggestion test denied summary judgment on the issue of
nonobviousness in a little over a quarter of the Federal Circuit's vaca-
tions during the study's four-year period. Lack of a claim element in
the prior art, or an erroneous claim interpretation, played an equal
147 These other reasons, in most instances, were basic legal errors. See, e.g.,
TorPharm, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc., 336 F.3d 1322, 1331-32 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(concluding that nothing in the prosecution history could overcome the statutory
mandate to assess a patent claim's nonobviousness in litigation).
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role in vacating nonobviousness determinations as the suggestion test.
The suggestion test was a factor, but no more so than other reasons
the court used to vacate summary judgments.
When looked at in the context of the complete universe of forty-
one summary judgments that were appealed, the suggestion test is
seen as playing a very small role in preventing summary judgment.
The suggestion test was a barrier to summary judgment in only
17.07% of all patents subject to summary judgment in the study.
These findings do not support the assertion that the suggestion test is
a major obstacle to summary judgment on the issue of nonobvious-
ness. It plays no more, and perhaps less, of a role than other parts of
the nonobviousness analysis or other parts of the patent litigation
process.
This micro-level study does not, however, include all summary
judgments on the issue of nonobviousness over the four-year period.
Summary judgments may have been denied at the district court level
due to the suggestion test and simply not appealed. The factual
nature of the suggestion test may also stand as an obstacle to clearer
evaluations of threats of litigation or offers to license.
But, again, the study indicates that the Federal Circuit did not
systematically use the suggestion test as a barrier to summary judg-
ment over the four-year period. True, in some instances, such as KSR,
the suggestion test was used to vacate a summary judgment on nonob-
viousness. But this was one of only seven instances. These data
points, by themselves, do not define an overwhelming trend. And
they certainly do not signal one to patent players. The real barrier to
summary judgment in nonobviousness cases may be the nature of
summary judgment itself and, perhaps, the Federal Circuit's general
view toward the procedural device.
CONCLUSION
The study provides much needed insight into the Federal Cir-
cuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence. In turn, it informs the discourse
on nonobviousness reform and the pending KSR case. Both the
macro-level and micro-level studies provide some interesting findings.
Some of those findings from the macro-level study are as follows:
(1) The almost even distribution between findings of nonobvious
(36.27%) and obvious (28.43%) in appeals from patent infringement
cases; and
(2) The high percentage of findings of obvious (85.19%) in




Neither of these results directly addresses 
whether the Federal
Circuit has lowered the nonobviousness 
requirement. As discussed,
however, they do create at least a weak inference 
that the standard has
not been relaxed, particularly in the 
USPTO setting. If the bar had
been lowered, one would expect a higher 
number of nonobvious find-
ings. Furthermore, of relevance to 
recent claims, these findings
clearly do not give support to recent assertions-that 
the bar has been
lowered.
Some of the more interesting findings 
from the micro-level study
are:
(1) the small role the suggestion 
test plays in nonobviousness
determinations, leading to a finding of 
nonobvious, or denying a find-
ing of obvious, in 24.5% of the patents 
appealed from patent infringe-
ment cases and 9.26% of patent appealed 
from the USPTO; and
(2) the small role the suggestion test 
plays in vacations of sum-
mary judgment on nonobviousness, leading 
to a denial in 17.07% of
the patents appealed.
These findings have a direct bearing 
on the reason most believe
the nonobviousness standard has decreased-the 
suggestion test. The
study's results indicate that the suggestion 
test only forces a finding of
nonobvious in one-third of patent infringement 
appeals and one-
tenth of appeals from the USPTO. If 
the bar has decreased, another
factor is to blame. In addition, while the 
Federal Circuit does vacate a
good number of summary judgments 
on nonobviousness (60.98%),
the suggestion test can only account 
for less than one-third of those
vacations. Assertions that the existence 
of the suggestion test forces a
trial on nonobviousness are not supported.
All of these findings should, at the very 
least, give pause to recent
calls to modify or do away with the 
suggestion test and the Federal
Circuit's recent nonobviousness jurisprudence. 
This is particularly
true when they are combined with the 
recent findings of Professors
Petherbridge and Wagner and Professor 
Mandel -1 48 It does not
appear that the court is tilted one way 
or the other. Nor does the
suggestion test seem to be playing as 
large of a role in the jurispru-
dence as thought. This is not to say that 
the suggestion test and the
Federal Circuit should be ignored. 
Instead, the study suggests that
those wishing to reform nonobviousness should 
expand those parts of,
and players in, the patent process subject 
to investigation and possible
change.
148 Mandel, Experimental Study, supra note 
28, at 11-20; Petherbridge & Wagner,
supra note 5 (manuscript at 5-20).
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